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Second Degree Murder Replaces Voluntary
Manslaughter in Illinois: Problems Solved,
Problems Created
James B. Haddad*
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective July 1, 1987, the Illinois legislature replaced the offense
of murder with first degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter
with second degree murder. The legislation, however, preserved
the distinction between these two grades of homicide. Thus, an
unjustified knowing or intentional killing is second degree murder
rather than first degree murder if the defendant killed under pro-
voked passion or under an unreasonable belief of justification. The
legislature, however, cast upon the defendant the burden of prov-
ing either of these mitigating circumstances to reduce an unjusti-
fied knowing or intentional killing to second degree murder.'
This Article treats questions that might arise under the new stat-
ute. I avoid repeating observations made in Professor Timothy
O'Neill's and Judge Robert Steigmann's thoughtful articles con-
cerning the new statute.2 Instead, I highlight our areas of
disagreement.
Difficulties under the new law will generate criticisms by those
who believe that, without a radical statutory amendment, trial
judges could have avoided problems that arose under the former
law. Although a legislative solution was necessary, the legislature
should have adopted a simpler proposal to resolve existing
problems without creating new difficulties. Nevertheless, the new
statute solves problems that not even the most pragmatic judge
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., 1964, Notre
Dame; J.D., 1967, L.L.M., 1969, Northwestern University School of Law. Professor
Haddad is Chairman of the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in
Criminal Cases and served at the 1987 Illinois Judicial Conference as Co-Reporter with
Professor James Carey, for the Criminal Law sessions on the new homicide law. The
views expressed in this Article, however, are strictly his own.
1. Pub. L. No. 84-1450 effected these changes by amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
paras. 9-1, 9-2 (1987).
2. See O'Neill, An Analysis of Illinois' New Offense of Second Degree Murder, 20 J.
MAR. L. REv. 209 (1986); Steigmann, First and Second Degree Murder in Illinois, 75 ILL.
B.J. 494 (1987).
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could have resolved under the former law. The thoughtful judge
should be able to handle most of the difficulties arising under the
new statute.
II. THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The crux of the problem under the old murder-voluntary man-
slaughter scheme was twofold. First, the 1961 Illinois Criminal
Code (the "Code") defined murder without reference to the ab-
sence of the mitigating circumstances that supposedly distin-
guished murder from voluntary manslaughter. Second, the Code
required proof of every element of murder, plus proof of the pres-
ence of mitigating circumstances in order to sustain a voluntary
manslaughter conviction.3 Consistent with these statutes, the Illi-
nois Pattern Jury Instructions ("I.P.I.") Committee in 1968 ap-
proved instructions that reflected two anomalies. The issues
instruction for murder made irrelevant whether a defendant acted
either out of sudden and intense passion after serious provocation,
or upon the unreasonable belief that facts existed that would have
justified his conduct. Moreover, whenever the jury returned a vol-
untary manslaughter verdict, it necessarily found that the state had
proved the only elements relevant to the charge of murder. Ac-
cordingly, if it complied with those instructions, a jury would
never return a voluntary manslaughter verdict without also re-
turning a murder verdict.4
My earliest memory of discussion of these anomalies includes a
recollection of a statement by a thoughtful, pragmatic, and by no
means anti-intellectual judge. Appreciating the theoretical con-
cerns, the Honorable Marvin Aspen asked whether anyone had en-
countered a practical difficulty with the murder-voluntary
3. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1, 9-2 (1985). The phrase "mitigating circum-
stances" as used in this Article includes "passion-provocation" and "unreasonable belief
of justification" as those terms are defined under the old voluntary manslaughter law and
the new second degree murder statute.
4. See ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 7.02, 7.04, 7.06 (Crim.) (1st ed.
1968) (hereinafter cited as "I.P.I."). O'Neill, supra note 2, at 218, incorrectly states that
in § 7.06 the I.P.I. Committee "[p]erversely" required the state to prove the absence of
"unreasonable belief," thus "radically" departing from § 7.04, which required the state to
prove the presence of passion-provocation. A simple reading indicates that § 7.06 did not
require proof of the absence of an unreasonable belief. The Committee added this re-
quirement only in the sample instruction § 27.01, prepared by Professor Prentice Mar-
shall. The § 27.01 requirement that the state prove the absence of mitigating
circumstances in order to obtain a murder conviction was intended to apply when either
form of voluntary manslaughter was in issue. The history of the sample instruction is
told in Haddad, Allocation of Burdens in Murder. Voluntary Manslaughter Cases.: An Af-
firmative Defense Approach, 59 CH.-KENT. L. REV. 23, 33, 49-56 (1982).
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manslaughter jury instructions during the trial of a homicide case.5
He correctly asserted that juries somehow were distinguishing be-
tween murder and voluntary manslaughter. They were not signing
multiple guilty verdict forms; but rather, they were choosing be-
tween murder and voluntary manslaughter, generally in accord
with the verdict that the trial judge would have predicted. Judge
Aspen, joined by leading constitutional scholar John Nowak6 and
by a majority of the committee that drafted the revisions, approved
instructions that left the anomalies which Professor O'Neill and I
later would discuss at length.
Problems arose later, however, as juries occasionally signed ver-
dict forms finding the defendant guilty of both murder and volun-
tary manslaughter in situations in which the defendant had killed
only one victim.8 To prevent such multiple guilty verdicts some
judges, without altering the basic instructions, gave the jury three
verdict forms, "guilty of murder," "guilty of voluntary manslaugh-
ter," and "not guilty," and told the jury that they must sign only
one of these forms.9 This solution defied logic and created a consti-
tutional question. It avoided multiple guilty verdicts through the
use of manifestly inconsistent instructions.10 On the one hand, the
5. Judge Aspen was then a judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and a member
of the I.P.I. Committee. The recollections stated are my own and were not preserved in
writing.
6. Committee Member Nowak, co-author of J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1983), prepared for Committee consideration homicide
instructions for inclusion in the Second Edition.
7. See O'Neill, "With Malice Toward None": A Solution to an Illinois Homicide
Quandary, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 107 (1982); Haddad, supra note 4. The Committee, in
response to judicial criticism, eliminated the additional proposition from sample instruc-
tion § 27.01. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 33, 51.
8. See e.g., People v. Almo, 108 I11. 2d 54, 483 N.E.2d 203 (1985); People v. Hoffer,
106 I11. 2d 186, 478 N.E.2d 335 (1985); People v. Washington, 127 II1. App. 3d 365, 468
N.E.2d 1285 (1st Dist. 1984); People v. Kendricks, 121 Ill. App. 3d 442, 459 N.E.2d 1137
(1st Dist. 1984); People v. Fox, 114 Il1. App. 3d 593, 449 N.E.2d 261 (1st. Dist. 1983);
People v. Taylor, 36 I11, App. 3d 898, 344 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist. 1976). See also Haddad,
supra note 4, at 33-34.
9. See, e.g., People v. Almo, 108 I11. 2d 54, 483 N.E.2d 203 (1985).
10. The use of inconsistent instructions about a material issue may violate due pro-
cess. It is fundamentally unfair for the trial court to contradict itself in instructing the
jury about an important matter. See Thomas v. Leeke, 725 F.2d 246, 252 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Harless v. Anderson, 664 F.2d 610, 612 (6th Cir. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 4 (1985); People v. Jenkins, 69 Il1. 2d 61, 370 N.E.2d 532
(1977). Candor requires the acknowledgment that I have advanced this claim as an advo-
cate for the appellant in a pending appeal, People v. Flowers, No. 86-2441, Illinois Appel-
late Court, First District. In Flowers, the trial judge instructed the jury in the same
fashion as had the trial judge in Almo, 108 Ill. 2d 54, 483 N.E.2d 203 (1985). The Illinois
Supreme Court in Almo had no occasion to resolve a due process challenge to the incon-
sistent instructions.
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judge gave instructions that mandated that if a jury found the de-
fendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, it must also find him
guilty of murder. On the other hand, the judge told the jury that
such multiple guilty verdict forms were impermissible, but did not
provide the jury any basis for choosing between the contradictory
instructions.
The Fourth Appellate District arrived at a different solution in
People v. Bolden." The court modified the murder instructions to
require that the prosecution prove the absence of the mitigating
circumstances that distinguish murder from voluntary manslaugh-
ter. 1 2 This approach, which Professor Prentice Marshall first had
suggested in sample instructions prepared in 1968, 3 also was
flawed. If the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant committed an unjustified knowing or intentional killing,
but the jury found that the evidence was fairly close as to whether
the statutorily defined mitigating circumstances had been present,
the instructions directed the jury to convict the unjustified killer of
neither murder nor voluntary manslaughter.' 4
Despite Professor O'Neill's strong criticism of the I.P.I. Com-
mittee' 5 and suggestions by the Illinois Supreme Court that the
Committee should find a solution,' 6 no one to this day has pro-
posed jury instructions that would avoid the anomalies while re-
maining true to decided cases.' 7 As long as Illinois law provided
that one of the elements of voluntary manslaughter was either pas-
11. 132 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 477 N.E.2d 1380 (4th Dist. 1985). See also People v.
Clark, 165 Il. App. 3d 210, 518 N.E.2d 763 (3d Dist. 1988); People v. Chevalier, 167 Il1.
App. 3d 790, 521 N.E.2d 1256 (2d Dist. 1986); People v. Williams, 134 Ill. App. 3d 334,
480 N.E.2d 205 (4th Dist. 1985).
12. Bolden, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1058, 477 N.E.2d at 1387.
13. See supra notes 4 and 7.
14. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 50 (pointing out the "gap" under Professor Mar-
shall's approach). See also O'Neill, supra note 2, at 218; O'Neill, "Murder Least Foul".
A Proposal to Abolish Voluntary Manslaughter in Illinois, 72 ILL. B.J. 306, 307 (1984).
15. O'Neill, supra note 2, at 218.
16. See People v. Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d 186, 478 N.E.2d 335 (1985).
17. Professor O'Neill suggested that the court should instruct the jury that, when the
state established the elements of murder, the jury should find the defendant guilty of
voluntary manslaughter instead of murder if, and only if, the state also proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the presence of mitigating circumstances. His approach tracked the
statutes literally, but he did not explain how the jury could be told not to sign a murder
verdict in some instances when it found that the state had proved every element of mur-
der. O'Neill, supra note 14, at 308. More significantly, when both murder and voluntary
manslaughter were in issue, no case had held that the state had to establish mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a manslaughter verdict. "Some evi-
dence" appeared to be enough. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 39. Moreover, O'Neill's
proposed instruction was inconsistent with some Illinois case law holding that sometimes
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sion-provocation or unreasonable belief of justification, the jury in-
struction difficulties were unavoidable."8 As an I.P.I. Committee
member, I contemplated the problem for over a decade without
arriving at a solution I viewed as satisfactory.' 9
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
In 1982, I proposed a legislative solution for the murder-volun-
tary manslaughter problem.2 ° Under this recommendation, when
both murder and voluntary manslaughter were in issue, proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of a knowing or intentional unjustified
killing would give the prosecution a conviction of at least volun-
tary manslaughter. If the prosecution also proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the killing had not been accompanied by either
of the statutorily defined mitigating circumstances, it would be en-
titled to a murder conviction. My proposal included very simple
jury instructions that would be given under such a statutory
scheme.2' It also included provisions under which the prosecution
could charge voluntary manslaughter when prosecutors believed
that the killing was accompanied by the statutorily defined mitigat-
ing circumstances.2 2 The proposal acquired the sponsorship of
Senator George Sangmeister and passed the Illinois Senate by a
unanimous vote in 1983.23 The House Judiciary Committee, how-
ever, prevented its consideration by the full House. 24
During this same period, Professor Timothy O'Neill had been
considering the same problems. A month or two after publication
of my 1982 article, O'Neill, working completely independently,
the evidence could sustain a voluntary manslaughter verdict when it was insufficient to
establish the elements of murder. Id. at 29-30.
Finally, when the defendant claimed that mitigating circumstances were present, it
would have been confusing to tell a jury that it should not return a voluntary manslaugh-
ter verdict unless the state established the presence of mitigating circumstances. Having
articulated these criticisms, I acknowledge that O'Neill's suggestion was as good as any
and better than most.
18. People v. Fausz, 95 Ill. 2d 535, 449 N.E.2d 78 (1983).
19. I once suggested that courts, even without a legislative amendment, could in-
struct the jury as they would if the legislature adopted the scheme that I proposed. That
legislative proposal is discussed in the text accompanying notes 20-24, infra. See Haddad,
supra note 4, at 56-59, 64-66. I dropped that suggestion after concluding that it was
inconsistent with People v. Fausz, 95 Ill. 2d 535, 449 N.E.2d 78 (1983). See Haddad,
supra note 4, at 62.
20. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 44-46, 63-64.
21. Id. at 64-66.
22. See infra note 80.
23. S. 524, 83rd Il1. Gen. Assem., 1983 Sess.; 1 SENATE JOURNAL ILLINOIS 1916-17
(May 23, 1983).
24. 2 HousE JOURNAL ILLINOIS 4420-21 (June 14, 1983).
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published his first article in this area, covering some of the same
ground, but adding fresh insights and a valuable historical perspec-
tive.25 In 1984, in his second article, O'Neill offered his own legis-
lative solution.26 He called for a change in the name of the
offenses, suggesting the replacement of murder and voluntary man-
slaughter with first degree murder and second degree murder re-
spectively. Under his approach, the prosecution would be entitled
to at least a conviction of second degree murder if it established
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowingly or
intentionally killed another without justification. When it pro-
vided such proof, it would be entitled to a conviction of first degree
murder unless, from all of the evidence presented, the jury con-
cluded by a preponderance of evidence that at least one of the stat-
utorily defined mitigating circumstances had been present at the
time of the killing.
The Honorable Robert Steigmann, judge of the Sixth Judicial
Circuit in Urbana, drafted a bill that embodied most of Professor
O'Neill's suggestions. 27 Instead of using a "free-flowing" burden
approach,28 however, Judge Steigmann placed the burden on the
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the pres-
ence of mitigating circumstances in order to reduce the grade of
the offense from first degree murder to second degree murder. He
also mandated that the jury first consider the issue of first degree
murder and only go on to the question of second degree murder if
it finds beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of every element of
first degree murder, namely that the defendant had knowingly or
intentionally killed without legal justification. The Steigmann lan-
guage was adopted in all essential respects and became law effec-
tive July 1, 1987.29 It did not appear to permit the prosecution the
option of charging second degree murder even when prosecutors
believed that mitigating circumstances were present.30
In summary, the differences between the new law and what I
characterize as the simpler solution that had been before the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1983 are as follows:
1. My proposal retained the old names of "murder" and "vol-
untary manslaughter." The new law uses the names "first degree
murder" and "second degree murder."
25. See O'Neill, supra note 7.
26. O'Neill, supra note 14.
27. S. 522, H.R. 913, 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess.
28. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1, 9-2 (1987).
30. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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2. My proposal required the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of mitigating circumstances, when they were in
issue, in order to obtain a conviction of murder rather than volun-
tary manslaughter. The new law requires the defendant to prove
by a preponderance of evidence the presence of mitigating circum-
stances, when they are in issue, in order to obtain a second degree
murder conviction instead of a first degree murder conviction.
3. The new law requires that juries complete their determina-
tions as to the elements of first degree murder and to consider the
issues in second degree murder only after they first find that the
state has met its burden as to every element of first degree murder.
My proposal did not mandate that the jury complete its delibera-
tions as to murder before considering the issues in voluntary
manslaughter.
4. My proposal would have allowed the prosecutor to charge
the lesser form of homicide when mitigating circumstances were
present. The O'Neill-Steigmann approach does not.
Many of the problems that judges will encounter under the new
law would have been avoided under the proposal that the House
Committee rejected in 1983. The differences between that proposal
and the one enacted will manifest themselves in complexities sure
to arise under the new statutory scheme.
IV. COMPLEXITY IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FLOWING FROM
DIFFERING BURDENS WITHIN A SINGLE CASE AND
FROM LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO DICTATE
THE ORDER OF JURY
DELIBERATIONS
A. Differing Burdens
The usual Illinois approach to affirmative defenses makes for
simple jury instructions. Once sufficient evidence is introduced to
put into issue an affirmative defense, such as self-defense or entrap-
ment, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of those facts that constitute the defense in order to pre-
vail.3' Thus, to the issues instruction for the substantive offense,
the court merely adds one more proposition which the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.32
When the legislature instead places upon a defendant the burden
of showing the facts constituting a defense by a preponderance in
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-2 (1987).
32. See, &g., I.P.I. §§ 24-25.04A, 24-25.06A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981).
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order to prevail, as it did, for example, in altering the Illinois in-
sanity defense statute, aa jury instructions became more complex.
Now two different parties bear burdens of proof, and those burdens
vary quantitatively.3 4
Under my proposal to make voluntary manslaughter a partial
affirmative defense to murder, simplicity in instructions is possi-
ble.3 5 The jury is told that to obtain a voluntary manslaughter con-
viction, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a
knowing or intentional unjustified killing. To obtain a murder con-
viction, the prosecution additionally must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt the absence of the statutorily defined mitigating
circumstances. Under the proposal that became law, however, the
matter is not that simple. For first degree murder, the court can-
not add a single proposition to the issues instruction for second
degree murder. Instead, it must tell the jury that as to some issues
the burden is on the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but as to
another issue, the burden is on the defendant by a preponderance.36
Additionally, the court must define "preponderance. ' '37
Moreover, the complexity is aggravated when the "unreasonable
belief" type of second degree murder is in issue. The court must
instruct the jury that to establish elements of first degree murder
the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of a reasonable belief in the existence of justifying facts,
but that to reduce the offense to second degree murder, the defend-
ant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
the presence of an unreasonable belief in the existence of justifying
facts.38
Admittedly, complexity by itself should not be determinative in
the debate over who should have the burden of proving the pres-
ence or absence of mitigating circumstances that reduce the grade
of the homicide. Nor should complexity in instructions definitively
resolve the policy question of which side should bear the burden of
any particular affirmative defense. Nonetheless, in light of other
complexities flowing from legislative efforts to structure the order
33. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-2(e) (1987).
34. See, e.g., I.P.I. § 24-25.01A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981) (1987 Supp.). The burden is on
the prosecution to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is on
the defendant to establish by a preponderance the facts constituting a defense.
35. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 64-66.
36. See I.P.I. §§ 7.04A, 7.06A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981) (Supp. 1987).
37. See Committee Note to I.P.I. §§ 7.04A and 7.06A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp.
1987).
38. See I.P.I. § 7.06A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1987).
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of jury deliberations under the new Illinois homicide law, the legis-
lature should have paid serious attention to questions of complex-
ity in the instructions that it was effectively mandating.
B. Structuring the Order of Deliberations
Legislative efforts to dictate the order of jurors' deliberations ap-
parently are a relatively recent phenomenon in Illinois criminal
law.39 In a 1984 law drafted by Judge Steigmann, the legislature
required that jurors not reach the issue of insanity unless and until
the jury has found that the prosecution had proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt every element of the offense charged.40 This was the
prime precedent for the new homicide statute's direction that ju-
rors consider the question of second degree murder only after they
have determined that the state has proved every element of first
degree murder.
When the legislature directs the order in which juries shall con-
sider issues in a criminal case, it effectively mandates lengthy, com-
plex jury instructions, unlike those typically employed in Illinois
cases. By requiring that the jury be told that it must consider first
degree murder rather than second degree murder, the legislature
requires that issue instructions for the two offenses be combined.
The matter becomes even more complex when insanity and guilty
but mentally ill verdicts are possibilities in a case in which the jury
is being charged on first degree and second degree murder.
The drafters of the instruction used a flow chart, suggested by
First Assistant Appellate Defender Robert Davison, in their efforts
to comply with the statutory mandate in such cases. Aided by
Judge Steigmann, they converted the flow chart into appropriate
instructions. When only first degree murder and "passion-provo-
cation" second degree murder are in issue, the instruction is ap-
proximately four hundred and thirty-five words long.' When
insanity and guilty but mentally ill are also in issue, the suggested
instruction is approximately eight hundred and eighty words
long.42 Of course, when the court instructs on both forms of sec-
ond degree murder ("unreasonable belief" as well as "passion-
provocation"), each of these instructions is lengthened by approxi-
39. Because they are different analytically, I exclude from this discussion those
schemes in which the legislature has ordered bifurcated proceedings, such as the current
Illinois death penalty statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1987).
40. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-2(e) (1987) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 83-
288, eff. Jan. 1, 1984).
41. See I.P.I. § 7.04A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1987).
42. See I.P.I. § 24-25.01F (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1987).
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mately forty-five words.4
The instructions are foreign to the system of criminal instruc-
tions in Illinois, where simplicity ordinarily has prevailed. Illinois
has a modem criminal code, with crisp definitions of offenses that
require little judicial interpolation. As a result, Illinois courts, un-
like federal courts, ordinarily are able to define issues in criminal
cases with relative simplicity. By comparison to both the instruc-
tions previously used in the chapter on homicide," and the instruc-
tions drafted for use in connection with my proposal,4 the
instructions implementing the new law are extraordinarily com-
plex. A reading of the instructions will bring home to the reader
the level of complexity that the legislature effectively has
mandated."
The theoretician might argue that reform in the penal law
should not be stymied by envisioned difficulties in drafting jury in-
structions. The pragmatist would respond that reform is meaning-
less unless jury instructions can adequately inform the jury of its
task by translating substantive principles into comprehendible
guides for the jury. Possibly my concern is especially acute be-
cause, as present chairman of the I.P.I. Committee, I fear that
when judges first are called upon to use the combined first degree-
second degree-insanity-guilty but mentally ill instruction, the Com-
mittee will become a laughingstock. Nevertheless, the Committee
must follow the law, a reality sometimes ignored even by scholars
as perceptive as Professor O'Neill.47
The legislative effort to order jury deliberations is also a failure
because it is piecemeal. Consider, for example, a case in which the
court instructs the jury as to first degree murder, second degree
43. The drafters have not included in the 1987 Supplement instructions for cases in
which both forms of second degree murder are in issue. Thus, they followed the prece-
dent of the 1968 and 1981 drafters, leaving it to the judge to combine the instructions
separately provided for "passion provocation" and "unreasonable belief of justification."
The instruction in the appendix to this Article demonstrates how the two forms of miti-
gating circumstances can be combined.
44. See I.P.I. §§ 7.04, 7.06 (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981).
45. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 64-66
46. See the instructions cited in notes 41-42 supra. In an appendix, I have set out a
single issue instruction for a homicide prosecution with facts similar to those in a recent
reported decision.
47. After condemning with vehemence the Illinois Supreme Court, Professor O'Neill
wrote, "The only defense that can be offered on the courts' behalf is their failure to re-
ceive assistance from the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions." O'Neill, supra note 2, at
217. During my thirteen years on the Committee, the members have believed that they
must follow the decisions of reviewing courts and of the legislature. We have not viewed
it as our role to guide the Illinois Supreme Court toward true law.
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murder, and involuntary manslaughter. The legislature has forced
the court to tell the jury to consider first degree murder before
considering second degree murder and to reach the question of sec-
ond degree murder only if the jury found that the prosecution has
proved the elements of first degree murder. Where does involun-
tary manslaughter fit in? Must the court tell the jury to postpone
its consideration of involuntary manslaughter until it unanimously
has agreed that the prosecution did not prove the elements of first
degree murder? As judges at the recent Judicial Conference ar-
gued, a court cannot very well tell the jury to complete delibera-
tions on first degree murder before considering second degree
murder without telling the jury where involuntary manslaughter
(or felony-murder)48 deliberations fit. As a result, judges will have
to lengthen the already extraordinarily long issues instruction man-
dated by the new law.49
V. OTHER PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM EFFORTS TO DICTATE
THE ORDER OF JURY DELIBERATIONS
An additional criticism of the new provision is that the legisla-
ture has mandated instructions that give greater emphasis to the
more serious offense of first degree murder and retard discussion of
second degree murder, even when the court has determined that
the evidence supports consideration of both. Some case law sug-
gests that courts should not tell the jury to first consider the greater
offense and only later to consider the lesser offense.5 0 Even if
courts reject this criticism about the legislative requirement that
48. Under the new statute, second degree murder is not to be considered under a
count charging felony-murder, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (1987), just as under
former law voluntary manslaughter was not to be considered under a count charging
felony-murder. A jury in a single case, however, might consider both felony-first degree
murder and, under a count charging a knowing or intentional killing, second degree mur-
der. See Committee Notes to I.P.I. §§ 7.04A, 7.06A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp.
1987). See also People v. Williams, 164 Ill. App. 3d 99, 517 N.E.2d 745 (3d Dist. 1987);
People v. Washington, 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 468 N.E.2d 1285 (1st Dist. 1985).
49. See the appendix for an example of a single issues instruction in a case arising
under the new law.
50. See People v. Whitelow, 162 Ill. App. 3d 626, 515 N.E.2d 1327 (4th Dist. 1987),
in which the court expressly condemned the practice. See also United States v. Jackson,
726 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984). In Whitelow, Jackson, and cases like them, the trial court
gives a "transition" instruction analytically different from the instruction at issue under
the new law. A transition instruction tells jurors to consider a lesser included offense
only if they do not unanimously agree that the accused is guilty of the greater offense.
Under the new Illinois law, the court tells the jurors to consider second degree murder
only if they agree that the state has established the elements of first degree murder. See
I.P.I. §§ 7.04A and 7.06A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1987).
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the jury consider first degree murder before considering second de-
gree murder, additional problems may remain.
For example, if in a case in which the judge instructs about both
degrees of murder and about involuntary manslaughter, a judge
might tell the jury that consideration of involuntary manslaughter
should come after consideration of both first degree murder and
second degree murder. As suggested above,"1 the court will wish
to tell the jury where the involuntary manslaughter determination
fits, and this is the logical extrapolation from the new statute. But
what is the justification for this ordering of consideration? The dif-
ference between first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter
ordinarily will be whether the defendant killed another (1) "inten-
tionally" or "knowingly" so as to be guilty of murder, or
(2) merely "recklessly" so as to be guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter. 52 Why should the jury be required to decide whether
the mental state of murder was present and reach a unanimous
agreement that it was not before the jury considers the alternative
mental state for involuntary manslaughter? Although the case law
might not suffice to sustain an attack on the legislative ordering of
deliberations as the degrees of murder, it might lend support to an
attack on a trial judge's decision to tell the jury to consider first
degree murder before considering involuntary manslaughter.5 3
Additionally, the number of hung juries might escalate if juries
conscientiously adhere to instructions purporting to structure their
order of deliberations. By telling a jury that it can consider second
degree murder only if it unanimously has concluded that the state
has proved every element of first degree murder, a judge may dis-
courage the kind of give and take that historically has had a role in
jury deliberations. The problem is exemplified when a judge orders
completion of first degree murder deliberations before considera-
tion of involuntary manslaughter. A jury evenly divided about
whether the state has proved the requisite mental state for murder
would end its deliberations hung instead of considering the less
culpable alternative mental state required for involuntary man-
slaughter. The purists might see nothing wrong with discouraging
"compromise" verdicts. Pragmatists would hope that the jurors
would disregard the judge's instruction and use their common
sense, unanimously agreeing on either the greater or the lesser of-
51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1(a), 9-3.
53. See supra note 50. See also People v. Pastorino, 90 Ill. App. 3d 921, 414 N.E.2d
54 (1st Dist. 1980), rev'd 91 111. 2d 178, 435 N.E.2d 1144 (1982).
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fense rather than declaring themselves hung as to the greater of-
fense and going no farther. Accordingly, if they do reach a verdict,
it will only be because the jurors have disregarded the court's in-
structions as to the order of deliberations.
Finally, legislative structuring raises a question of separation of
powers under the Illinois Constitution. The legislature's role is to
define offenses and to provide penalties. But is it within the legisla-
tive purview to mandate the order in which jurors shall conduct
their deliberations? Because of the strong line of Illinois decisions
vindicating judicial prerogatives as to trial court procedures, it is
possible that Illinois courts would strike down this aspect of the
new statute.5 4 The most likely scenario is that, on a defendant's
pre-trial motion a judge would deem unconstitutional the legisla-
tive directions about the order of jury deliberations. Then, the
prosecution would appeal directly to the Illinois Supreme Court,
which would be called upon to resolve the question."
VI. SECOND DEGREE MURDER IN ISSUE WHEN THE
DEFENDANT HAS OFFERED No EVIDENCE
A consensus supports the conclusion that, if the defendant
wishes an instruction on second degree murder, he is entitled to it
even if the defendant presented no evidence, provided that during
the prosecution's case sufficient evidence was introduced to put
into issue the existence of mitigating circumstances.5 6 The main
controversy concerns how to instruct the jury in such a case. On
the one hand, the defendant need not offer any evidence; he can
point to mitigating evidence that is admitted during the prosecu-
tion's case. On the other hand, the defendant has the burden of
proof on the question even though he is not necessarily required to
call his own witnesses to establish mitigation. Jurors might not
readily understand the distinction.
Professor O'Neill suggests that the problem would not arise if
54. See People v. Callopy, 358 Il1. 11, 192 N.E. 643 (1934), in which the court, in
discussing an Illinois Supreme Court rule concerning the mode of instructing a jury,
suggested that jury instructions were within the province of a state's highest court. See
also People v. Joseph, 113 Iil. 2d 36, 495 N.E.2d 501 (1986), and People v. Jackson, 69
il. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977) (decisions that invalidate legislative enactments that
purported to regulate court procedures).
55. The Illinois Supreme Court would be the proper forum for an appeal from the
invalidation of the statute. ILL. S. CT. R. 603, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 603
(1987). In Joseph, 113 II!. 2d 36, 495 N.E.2d 501 (1986), the prosecutor was granted
leave to appeal as of right under similar circumstances.
56. See Steigmann, supra note 2, at 498; O'Neill, supra note 2 at 222; Committee
Note to I.P.I. § 2.03A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1987).
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the legislature had taken his suggestion that it assign no one the
burden of proof. 7 I have trouble following that suggestion. When
the jury must choose between first degree murder or second degree
murder depending upon the presence or absence of statutory miti-
gating circumstances, either the prosecution or the defense neces-
sarily must bear the risk of non-persuasion. The court must tell
the jury how to resolve the case if the evidence is evenly divided on
the question of mitigating circumstances. In other words, it must
specify who has the burden of proof. If the court does not, then
each jury will decide on its own who has the burden, something
that McCormick points out is quite undesirable. 58
O'Neill and I, along with others, agree that the jury must be told
that in determining whether mitigating circumstances were pres-
ent, it can consider all the evidence in the case, not just evidence
presented in one party's case.59 This is hardly a unique problem.
Even as to issues on which the state has the burden of proof, I.P.I.
instructions always mandate that the jury consider all the evidence
in deciding whether the state has met its burden.60
The problem hardly requires the declaration that no one has the
burden of proof or the creation of something called a "free-flowing
burden."'" So far, various instructions have been suggested as a
means of informing the jury that, although the defendant has the
burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances, the jury must con-
sider all of the evidence in determining whether the defendant has
met this burden.62
Professor O'Neill's alternative to these instructions would keep
57. See O'Neill, supra note 2, at 222.
58. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (3d ed. 1984).
59. See O'Neill, supra note 2, at 222; Steigmann, supra note 2, at 498.
60. See, e.g., I.P.I. §§ 7.02, 7.04, 7.06 (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981).
61. O'Neill has used the term "free-flowing burden" in various oral presentations
concerning his proposal. The term designates his conception of a situation in which
neither party has the burden of proof. Instead the jury is to decide based upon all the
evidence whether or not mitigating circumstances accompanied the killing. See O'Neill,
supra note 2, at 222.
62. I.P.I. § 2.01A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1987), provides in relevant part:
If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
First Degree Murder, the defendant then has the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factor is present so that he is guilty
of the lesser offense of Second Degree Murder, and not guilty of First Degree
Murder. In deciding whether a mitigating factor is present, you should con-
sider all of the evidence bearing on this question. [The defendant is not re-
,4L1re. .,, prescit any ,videucc in order to cstablish the existence of a mitigating
factor.]
Judge Steigmann, a member of the I.P.I. Committee, has suggested to the Committee
use of a separate instruction patterned after I.P.I. § 1.02 (Civil) (1972), which provides:
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from the jury the fact that the legislature has assigned the burden
to the defendant and would instead say only that the jury must be
convinced, based upon all the evidence, that the requisite mitigat-
ing circumstances have been established. 63 The drafters of the pat-
tern instructions could not logically adopt this solution without
altering the basic form of every issues instruction in I.P.I. Criminal
volume. To be consistent with O'Neill's suggestion, the instruc-
tions would have to tell the jury only that, in order to convict the
defendant of a particular crime, it must be convinced, beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon all of the evidence, that the enumer-
ated propositions have been established. In other words, the in-
structions would make no reference to the fact that the state must
shoulder the burden of proof as to the elements of an offense. This
is because, according to Professor O'Neill's reasoning, assigning a
burden of proof "obfuscates" the notion that the jury can consider
all the evidence in resolving an issue."
VII. PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER THE NEW NAME
The drafters of the new law insisted upon using the new names
"first degree murder" and "second degree murder" in place of
"murder" and "voluntary manslaughter. ' 65 Because the same mit-
igating circumstances that distinguished voluntary manslaughter
from murder now distinguish second degree murder from first de-
gree murder, the name change was not essential. The change was
not integral to the effort to straighten out burden-of-proof ques-
tions when mitigating circumstances are in issue. Moreover, the
term "second-degree murder" under the new law signifies some-
thing far different than usually is signified by that term in other
jurisdictions. 66 Some prosecutors fear that juries will view "first
degree murder" as more serious than murder, possibly equating it
with "capital murder," and therefore will be more reluctant to con-
vict a defendant of first degree murder. ' 67 The only reason offered
"In determining whether any proposition has been proved, you should consider all of the
evidence bearing on the question without regard to which party produced it."
63. See O'Neill, supra note 2, at 222.
64. Id.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9.1, 9-2 (1987). See O'Neill, supra note 14, at 308;
Steigmann, supra note 2, at 494.
66. The two degrees of murder usually are used to separate premeditated murder
from unpremeditated murder, a distinction created in the nineteenth century to avoid the
mandatory death penalty for less serious murders. See W. LAVAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 7.7 (2d ed. 1986).
67. I base this observation upon a conversation I had with the Hon. Fred Foreman on
March 18, 1988. Mr. Foreman is State's Attorney of Lake County, Illinois, and a mem-
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in support of the change of name was to attract attention to the
change and to hale a new beginning.6"
The price of the change was more complexity. What would have
been a two-page bill became a forty-page bill.69 Through the
magic, or the mindlessness, of computers, every place in the entire
Illinois Revised Statutes where the term "murder" appeared, the
statute now reads "first degree murder. ' 70 Wherever "voluntary
manslaughter" appeared, "second degree murder" now appears."' 7 1
Wherever the word "manslaughter" 72 appeared, "second degree
murder" now appears.' 3
Eventually, this change will breed litigation. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the killer who took seven lives in 1982 through Tylenol
tampering finally is caught. Under the terms of the new statute,
the appropriate charge would be murder rather than first degree
murder.74 Suppose that, after he is charged with murder, the ac-
cused raises a statute of limitations defense. Before July 1, 1987,
the general statute of limitations for felonies was three years, but
there was no limitations period for murder and voluntary man-
slaughter.' 5 Under the new law, the exceptions for murder and
voluntary manslaughter have been eliminated, and have been re-
placed with exceptions for first degree murder and second degree
murder. 6 If the alleged killer had resided openly in Illinois for the
whole period, he might claim that, because changes in statutes of
limitation are procedural, the new law applies to him and bars his
prosecution for murder or for voluntary manslaughter, which, as
of July 1, 1987, are governed by the general three-year limitations
period.
Perhaps courts would be quick to reject this claim, especially if
made in the context of such a notorious prosecution. They might
look beyond the plain language of the statute and conclude that
ber of the I.P.I. Committee. At the time of this conversation, his office already had gone
to the jury with several cases under the new statute.
68. O'Neill, supra note 2, at 308.
69. See P.A. 84-1450.
70. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 2-8, 3-5(a) (1987). Compare ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, paras. 2-8, 3-5(a) (1985).
71. Id.
72. "Manslaughter" here is distinguished from either "voluntary manslaughter" or
"involuntary manslaughter."
73. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 129, para. 220.71(b) (1987). Compare ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 129, para. 220.71(b) (1985).
74. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text (describing the problem of the effec-
tive date).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-5 (1985).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-5(a) (1987).
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obviously the legislature did not intend the apparent result."
Nonetheless, courts would never have to face this and numerous
other claims, including those arising under licensing-disqualifica-
tion procedures, if the legislature had not changed the names of the
offenses.
VIII. CHARGING SECOND DEGREE MURDER
One of the main concerns of attendants at the Judicial Confer-
ence was the possibility that the new statute does not permit a
prosecutor to charge second degree murder when he or she believes
that mitigating circumstances sufficient to justify reduction of the
crime to second degree murder accompanied the killing.79 It seems
wrong to require the prosecution to "overcharge," and, to do so
may make the prosecutor look bad in the eyes of the jury.
Although I once authored a proposal that would allow the pros-
ecution to charge the lesser form of homicide when it believed that
mitigating circumstances were present, the problem may be incapa-
ble of solution.80 If we treat mitigating circumstances as a partial
affirmative defense to first degree murder, then second degree mur-
der is not an offense in the conventional sense. Rather it is the
77. Trhe court might also rely upon language of the amendatory act that specifies that
the law applies only to homicides alleged to have occurred on or after January 1, 1987.
See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
78. Let us suppose that a defendant previously convicted of voluntary manslaughter
applies for a license under a statute that prohibits the licensing of persons who are under
the disability of one of several statutorily-enumerated felonies. Voluntary manslaughter
will no longer be on the list, having been replaced by second degree murder, Or, consider
the still more troubling cases where a statute formerly used the term "manslaughter" but
now reads "second degree murder." See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 129, para. 220.71(b)
(1987). Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 129, para. 220.71(b) (1985). Formerly, the term
"manslaughter" presumably included "involuntary manslaughter" as well as "voluntary
manslaughter." It is hard to see how the current term "second degree murder" could
possibly be construed to include "involuntary manslaughter."
79. An experienced criminal defense lawyer has already made the same point. See
Inman, New Homicide Legislation, ILL. ST. B.A. CRIM. J. NEWSLETTER, Vol. 30, No. 8,
p. 4 (March, 1987).
80. I proposed a statute under which the state could charge voluntary manslaughter
even though voluntary manslaughter ordinarily would be viewed as a partial affirmative
defense to murder. Under my proposal, by charging voluntary manslaughter, the prose-
cutor would have had to establish the presence of mitigating circumstances. If the de-
fense, however, refused to stipulate to the presence of mitigating circumstances before
trial, the prosecutor could elect to bring a murder charge instead. See Haddad, supra
note 4, at 60-61, 63. Some defense lawyers, including Mr. Inman, see note 79, supra, were
critical of this somewhat convoluted effort when I presented it to the Illinois State Bar
Association Criminal Justice Council in 1983. They disliked the notion that a defendant
could be coerced into stipulating to the presence of mitigating circumstances. Although
my proposal passed the Senate, it failed in the House. See supra notes 20-21 and accom-
panying text.
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result of the successful interposition of the partial affirmative de-
fense of passion-provocation or unreasonable justification. If, how-
ever, second degree murder is to be charged, the elements must be
defined, and the prosecution must be required to prove the pres-
ence of each element. Thus, if second degree murder is to be sepa-
rately chargeable, and if its elements include, for example, passion-
provocation, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the presence of passion-provocation to obtain a voluntary
manslaughter conviction." The latter situation is the one of the
very anomalies that the call for reform sought to eliminate.8 2
Neither Judge Steigmann nor probably Professor O'Neill be-
lieved that under their scheme prosecutors could charge second de-
gree murder as a separate offense. 3 In defense of this result, they
might respond that under the old system prosecutors rarely
charged voluntary manslaughter as a separate offense. Prosecutors
did not want to risk the loss of conviction on any charge in the
event that, after charging voluntary manslaughter, they proved an
intentional or knowing unjustified killing but failed to prove the
mitigating circumstances necessary for a voluntary manslaughter
conviction. 4 Moreover, under the new system, prosecutors can
concede in application for bond and in opening statements their
belief that mitigating circumstances were present to the extent that
the evidence will justify only a second degree murder conviction.
Nevertheless, some attendants at the Judicial Conference sug-
gested that courts should sustain a prosecutor's decision to charge
second degree murder. Some argued that in such a case a prosecu-
tor would voluntarily take on the burden of proving the mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. This approach cannot
be squared with the new statute, which requires the defendant to
prove by a preponderance the presence of mitigating circum-
stances. Moreover, even if it could be, the ordinary defendant in
the typical murder case might complain that the framing of the
81. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
82. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
83. Judge Steigmann expressly makes this point. Steigmann, supra note 2, at 496.
O'Neill does not, but his 1986 article, read as a whole, seems to suggest that second
degree murder is a judgment that can result only when the prosecution originally charged
first degree murder. See generally O'Neill, supra note 2.
84. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 37-38. Some attendants at the recent Judicial Con-
ference suggested that Cook County prosecutors almost never charged voluntary man-
slaughter under the former law; prosecutors from other counties did so occasionally,
charging both murder and voluntary manslaughter. These same attendants suggested
that "downstate" prosecutors will be aggrieved more than Cook County prosecutors if
they are not allowed to charge second degree murder.
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charge by the prosecutor should not dictate who has the burden of
proving mitigating circumstances for a second degree murder
conviction.
Other attendants suggested that the prosecutor who sought only
a second degree murder conviction could label the offense as sec-
ond degree murder in the indictment or information but still allege
only the elements of first degree murder, namely a knowing or in-
tentional unjustified killing. In effect, the prosecutor would be tell-
ing the court and the jury that he only seeks a second degree
murder conviction. The usual first degree murder instructions
would be used except that the term "second degree" would be sub-
stituted for the term "first degree." No reference to mitigating
circumstances would appear in the jury instructions. The argu-
ment is that, even if no evidence of mitigating circumstances was
presented by either side, a defendant convicted of knowingly or
intentionally and without justification killing another could not
complain that he was convicted of second degree murder.
Substituting the name "second degree murder" for "first degree
murder," but otherwise instructing as if only first degree murder
were in issue, might also be the solution to a problem first recog-
nized by Professor O'Neill. How should the system retry a defend-
ant who had been acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of
second degree murder, and who later won a new trial because of
procedural error?8 5 Nevertheless, calling something "second de-
gree murder" when the statute defines that conduct as first degree
murder seems to be quite a departure from the statutory scheme.
IX. THE PROBLEM OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE
As originally drafted, the bill that became Public Act 84-1450
made no mention of whether the new law would apply to offenses
committed before its effective date.8 6 I recommended to the House
Committee that, in order to avoid creating the right of election for
the defendant who was tried after the effective date for a pre-effec-
tive date offense, the following language should be added:
This amendatory legislation shall apply only to offenses commit-
ted on or after the effective date of the amendment. Homicides
committed before such date shall be governed by the law as it
existed on the date of such offenses.8 7
85. See O'Neill, supra note 14, at 225-27.
86. S. 522, H.R. 913, 84th 111. Gen. Assem., 1983 Sess.
87. Letter dated June 7, 1985, from James Haddad, to Hon. John Cullerton. Copy on
file with author.
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Instead, the legislature amended the proposal to provide that the
amendment would apply only to acts committed "on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1986. "81 The Governor's amendatory veto changed this to
"on or after January 1, 1987. " 89 The problem is that the bill does
not say when it became effective, and, for want of an effective date,
by operation of law, the bill apparently took effect on July 1,
1987.90
We thus have a law effective July 1, 1987, that says it applies to
homicides alleged to have occurred on or after January 1, 1987. 91
If the new law is viewed as harsher to defendants than the old law,
a defendant cannot be forced to accept prosecution under the new
scheme for a homicide alleged to have been committed during the
first six months of 1987.92 If, however, a defendant tried after July
1, 1987 asserted the right to be tried under the new procedure for a
crime allegedly committed during that six month period, as some
defendants already have, arguably he should be afforded his choice
because the new law is now in effect and on its face says that it
applies to acts committed after January 1, 1987.93 Under these cir-
cumstances, and until a reviewing court settles the matter, the
court might wish to afford the defendant an election as soon as
possible after arraignment.
If the defendant elects the new procedure for trial on a charge of
a homicide committed during the first six months of 1987, the
prosecution might have to get a new indictment or file an amended
information because of the legislative decision to change the names
of murder and voluntary manslaughter to first degree murder and
second degree murder. At trial, the jury would have to be told that
the defendant is charged with first degree murder, something that a
murder indictment prepared under the old law would not do.
88. 1 SENATE JOURNAL ILLINOIS 980, 1008 (May 14, 1985).
89. 3 SENATE JOURNAL ILLINOIS 4674 (November 6, 1986).
90. The General assembly concurred in the amendatory veto in the fall of 198b. 3
SENATE JOURNAL ILLINOIS 4724-25 (November 19, 1986); 3 HOUSE JOURNAL ILLINOIS
5487 (December 3, 1986). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1, para. 1202(2) (1985).
91. Pub. L. No. 84-1450, § 13. In the West Publishing Co. compilation of the Illinois
Revised Statutes, one must follow footnote directions closely to discover the language
that says that the law applies to acts alleged to have been committed on or after January
1, 1987. Eventually the careful reader is led to a note accompanying ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, para. 702-7 (1987).
92. Cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
93. See supra note 91.
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X. PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY OF "DEFENSE" OF PROVOCATION
OR OF UNREASONABLE BELIEF OF JUSTIFICATION
Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413, 91 the prosecution is en-
titled to discovery of defenses that the defendant may rely upon.
Presumably when a defendant gives notice of the defense of self-
defense, reasonable belief of justification, the prosecution is ade-
quately notified that "unreasonable belief of justification" may be
in issue.9 5 The harder question arises when the defense attempts to
put forth a theory of provocation that would reduce first degree
murder to second degree murder. Upon the prosecution's request
must the defendant provide advance notice of this "defense" to first
degree murder?
Under former law, voluntary manslaughter was a separate
crime, not a defense to the crime of murder. The new statute does
not specifically use the terms "defense" or "affirmative defense,"
but the scheme functions very much like a partial affirmative
defense.
Various other states with somewhat similar schemes require the
defense to give notice in advance of trial when it intends to rely
upon facts that reduce the grade of the homicide.96 Although the
pertinent statutes and rules are different in those jurisdictions, in
Illinois there is a distinct possibility that the defense will be re-
quired under Rule 413 to give notice of its intent to rely upon miti-
gating facts which would reduce first degree murder to second
degree murder.
A separate issue is whether the court can impose the ultimate
sanction for defense non-compliance with discovery requirements:
refusal to admit evidence in support of the defense theory. When
the defendant has given notice of a defense of self-defense or other
sort of justification, it is difficult to see how the prosecution has
been prejudiced by the defense's failure to notify the prosecution of
the "unreasonable belief" theory of mitigation.97 Again, the
harder question arises where the defense has not given advance no-
tice of the provocation theory. Until a reviewing court rules that
such notice is required, trial judges might choose not to impose the
ultimate sanction of exclusion of evidence. 98
94. ILL. S. CT. R. 413(d), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. lI0A, para. 413(d) (1987).
95. See People v. Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546, 413 N.E.2d 378 (1980). See also infra notes
111-14 and accompanying text.
96. See, eg., People v. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1985).
97. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
98. See Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 904 (1988) (upholding exclusion of defense testi-
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The requirement of notice, if imposed as to second degree mur-
der in Illinois, would not seem to violate the fifth amendment.
Provocation, for example, under the new Illinois scheme is much
more of a true defense than is alibi. The defendant has the burden
of establishing the facts that reduce first degree murder to second
degree murder. By contrast, the prosecution bears the burden of
proof on every issue in the case even when the defense offers an
alibi. Nevertheless, under Williams v. Florida,99 the requirement of
notice of alibi does not violate the Constitution.
XI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLACING BURDEN
ON THE DEFENDANT
The new scheme does not require the defendant to bear the bur-
den of negating the presence of any element of an offense. °° Under
the new scheme there is no overlap between any element that the
prosecution must prove to establish first degree murder and facts
that the defense must prove to reduce the grade of the offense to
second degree murder. The recent decision of Martin v. Ohio 101
permitted Ohio to place on the defendant the burden of establish-
ing self-defense. Under the analysis appearing in Martin, the less
drastic Illinois scheme concerning grades of homicide appears
constitutional.
XII. Is THE PROSECUTION ENTITLED TO THE SECOND
DEGREE INSTRUCTION OVER THE DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION? CAN THE COURT GIVE THE
INSTRUCTION SUA SPONTE OVER
THE DEFENSE OBJECTION?
If the evidence suffices to warrant an instruction on second de-
gree murder, but the defense wants to go to the jury on a theory of
first degree murder or "not guilty," does it have that right? Under
former law, the court could instruct the jury on voluntary man-
mony where defense counsel, for tactical reasons, had deliberately withheld required dis-
covery material).
99. 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (rejecting self-incrimination challenge to Florida alibi notice
statute).
100. The best discussion of the constitutionality of the new statute appears in Judge
Steigmann's article. See Steigmann, supra note 2, at 495. Judge Steigmann addresses an
argument presented in unrecorded testimony to a General Assembly Committee by First
Assistant State Appellate Defender Robert Davison, who contended that the proposal
was unconstitutional. See also the thoughtful discussion in O'Neill, supra note 2, at 221-
22.
101. 107 S. Ct. 1098, reh'g denied 107 S. Ct. 1913 (1987).
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slaughter when the evidence warranted it, even if the defendant
objected. 0 2 Judge Steigmann, however, says that the defendant
has a right to prevent the giving of a second degree murder instruc-
tion. 0 3 Professor O'Neill concurs, incorrectly claiming that the
statute "specifically" gives the defendant that right.1 4 The statute
speaks of the procedure to be followed in a jury trial when the
defense requests the giving of the second degree instruction. 10 5
I believe that the statutory language does not specifically negate
the possibility of an instruction given over defense objection.0 6 As
previously suggested, I cannot see how a defendant can claim prej-
udice on appeal when he was found guilty of second degree mur-
der. 0 7 By definition, such a finding reflects the jury's belief that
every element of first degree murder was established. Other juris-
dictions with statutes analogous to the new Illinois statute allow
the court to instruct on the lesser grade of homicide even over the
defense objections. 08
When the evidence warrants the instruction but the defense law-
yer says the defendant does not want such an instruction, the care-
ful judge may choose to both admonish the defendant of his right
to the instruction and obtain an on-the-record waiver. This ordi-
narily would preclude a later attack arising from the failure of the
court to give the second degree murder instruction. One recent
Seventh Circuit decision, using the rubric of "incompetency of
counsel," granted habeas corpus relief when, in the absence of a
knowing waiver by the defendant himself, the judge did not give an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter.109
102. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d 483, 224 N.E.2d 266 (1967); People v.
Hough, 102 Ill. App. 2d 287, 243 N.E.2d 520 (1st Dist. 1968).
103. Steigmann, supra note 2, at 496.
104. O'Neill, supra note 2, at 229.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (1987).
106. Carried to its logical extreme, application of the expressio unius principle would
preclude a second degree murder judgment in any situation other than a jury trial in
which the defendant asked for a jury instruction on second degree murder. Thus, a court
could never consider second degree murder in a bench trial even when the defense sought
such consideration.
107. See supra Section VIII.
108. See, e.g., State v. Asherman, 195 Conn. 695, 478 A.2d 227 (1985). The
Asherman opinion spoke of the proper role of a court in tones quite similar to Justice
Schaefer's in People v. Taylor, 36 11. 2d 483, 224 N.E.2d 266 (1967) (judge serves the
public interests and need not defer to an agreement between the prosecutor and the de-
fense not to instruct on the intermediate verdict).
109. United States ex reL Barnard v. Lane, 819 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987).
1988] 1017
Loyola University Law Journal
XIII. SHOULD THE COURT GIVE THE INSTRUCTION WHEN
THE DEFENSE NEITHER REQUESTS THE INSTRUCTION
NOR OBJECTS TO THE INSTRUCTION?
Professor O'Neill's article provides extensive, thoughtful discus-
sion of this question." 0 The issue will arise in reviewing courts
when the evidence appears to have justified the instruction on sec-
ond degree murder but when the judge gave no such instruction
and the record is silent as to why the defense did not tender the
instruction, and the judge did not obtain a waiver of the instruc-
tion. Under the former statutory scheme, the defendant was enti-
tled to an "unreasonable belief" voluntary manslaughter
instruction whenever the judge instructed on self-defense.' 1  As
O'Neill notes, however, some reviewing courts have held that the
judge did not have to give the voluntary manslaughter instruction
sua sponte even under these circumstances.' 2
The question is largely academic, under both the old and new
schemes, if the trial judge properly admonishes the defendant of his
right to such an instruction. If the court instructs the jury on self-
defense, the defense does not tender a second degree murder in-
struction, and the court decides to forego the instruction unless the
defendant wishes it, the court should inquire of the defendant on
the record whether he wishes the instruction. If he declines the
instruction, and if the court agrees not to give the instruction, the
court should obtain a knowing waiver on the record. The court
should follow a similar procedure when there is sufficient evidence
of provocation to warrant a second degree murder instruction but
when the defense has not tendered such an instruction.
XIV. BENCH TRIAL CONSIDERATION OF SECOND
DEGREE MURDER
Both Professor O'Neill and Judge Steigmann conclude that the
judge must not consider second degree murder in a non-jury trial
when the defendant has not asked for such consideration or has
objected to such consideration. 13 They reason that because a de-
fendant has the right to preclude jury consideration of second de-
gree murder, he must have the right to preclude a judge's
consideration of second degree murder in a bench trial. I believe
110. O'Neill, supra note 2, at 228-29.
111. See People v. Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546, 413 N.E.2d 378 (1986).
112. See O'Neill, supra note 2, at 228.
113. See Steigmann, supra note 2, at 496-97; O'Neill, supra note 2, at 228.
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this premise is false.I 4 I also doubt whether the conclusion neces-
sarily follows from the premise. If a court announces a judgment
of second degree murder after the defendant has objected to con-
sideration of that alternative, it is hard to see how the defendant is
going to complain successfully. By definition, the judge has found
all essential elements of first degree murder. A reviewing court
likely will not find any prejudice. If the reviewing court reverses, it
will be because the evidence, as a matter of law, failed to establish
the elements necessary for first degree murder; these elements also
are necessary for second degree murder.
On the other hand, if the court accedes to a request by defense
counsel that it not consider second degree murder, serious
problems may arise, particularly when the judge hints on the rec-
ord, in finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder, that the
defense made a bad choice. The specter of ineffective assistance of
counsel looms.' " 5
A judge might announce a finding that the state has proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt every element of first degree murder.
Then, the trial judge could ask the defendant whether he wishes
the judge to go further and determine whether mitigating circum-
stances were established by a preponderance of evidence so as to
reduce the grade of the offense. This approach indicates the fool-
ishness of defense efforts to preclude a judge in a bench trial from
considering the possibility of second degree murder when the evi-
dence would warrant such consideration.1 6
XV. How MUCH EVIDENCE JUSTIFIES THE GIVING OF A
SECOND DEGREE MURDER INSTRUCTION?
Under the former statutory scheme, cases were very diverse as to
the amount of evidence that warranted a voluntary manslaughter
instruction. When the judge had refused the defense request for
such an instruction, and the jury had returned a murder verdict, it
appeared that quite a lot was required to entitle the defendant to
the instruction.1 7 If an instruction was given, however, and the
defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, that defend-
ant could argue on appeal that the instruction was unwarranted,
114. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
116. While arguing that the defendant has this right, O'Neill agrees that a defendant
would be foolish to try to prevent the court in a bench trial from considering second
degree murder. O'Neill, supra note 2, at 230.
117. See Haddad supra note 4, at 41 n.81.
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and that he was guilty of "murder or nothing." When such an
instance arose, very little evidence was deemed sufficient to justify
the instruction.'" 8
The new scheme does not say how much evidence is required to
warrant an instruction. Presumably, the question is analogous to
the one arising under the insanity defense statute. 1 9 In both cases,
the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. Accordingly, it can be argued that something more than
"some evidence" is required. The Criminal Code provision requir-
ing "some evidence" to put into issue an affirmative defense defini-
tion is not directly applicable because it contemplates a situation in
which the prosecution has the ultimate burden of negating a de-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 A judge might ask whether,
when viewing the evidence from the vantage point most favorable
to the defense, any reasonable jury would conclude that the requi-
site mitigating factors had been established by a preponderance.' 2'
Under the new statutory scheme, however, the court may choose
to err on the side of giving the second degree murder instruction
when little evidence justifies it. A defendant found guilty of second
degree murder will probably not have a valid argument akin to the
"murder or nothing" argument under former law. 22 If he is found
guilty of second degree murder when there was no evidence of mit-
igating circumstances, a defendant will be in no position to claim
prejudice. By definition, the jury would have found the presence of
every element required for first degree murder. Moreover, the
"mitigating circumstances" are no longer an essential element of a
distinct lesser offense, and the failure to prove them beyond a rea-
sonable doubt will be deemed harmless.
XVI. How TO PROCEED WHEN THE JURY FINDS THE
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF BOTH FIRST DEGREE
MURDER AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER
If jurors follow the instructions, they will not find the defendant
guilty of both first degree murder and second degree murder except
in the rare instance that one count charges felony-murder, a second
count charges an intentional or a knowing murder, and the court
118. Id.
119. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-2(e) (1987).
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-2(a) (1987).
121. Compare Pedrick v. Peoria and Eastern Ry., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504
(1967).
122. See supra notts 113-16 and accompanying text.
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instructs on second degree murder under the second count.'23 In
the latter instance, if the jury verdict form specifies that the jury
has found the defendant guilty of felony-murder, this finding
should control over a finding of second degree murder because sen-
tencing is appropriate on the more serious charge when the ver-
dicts are not inconsistent. 124
In cases not involving felony-murder, a jury would be acting in
contravention of its instructions if it found the defendant guilty of
both first degree murder and second degree murder. The verdicts
would signify that the jury simultaneously has found and has not
found that the defendant established by a preponderance of evi-
dence the presence of mitigating circumstances. 121 In such a case,
according to the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Hoffer ' 26 and
People v. Almo, 127 the judge should not enter judgment for either
the lesser or the greater offense. Almo suggests the judge could
order the jury to resume its deliberations and to choose between
the two verdicts. The judge would explain to the jury that its de-
termination of whether the defendant proved mitigating circum-
stances should dictate its verdict. Alternatively, Hoffer suggests
that the judge properly could declare a mistrial because of the in-
consistent verdicts. 128 Unless and until a reviewing court rules
otherwise, because of the costs involved in a mistrial, judges proba-
bly should elect the Almo approach.
XVII. AREAS OF THE LAW IN WHICH MURDER-VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER PRECEDENTS REMAIN GOOD LAW
A number of other issues that were resolved under the murder-
voluntary manslaughter scheme are likely to receive reconsidera-
tion under the new statutory scheme. In my view, in many in-
123. See supra note 48 (concerning felony-murder and second degree murder).
124. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 93 Ill. App. 3d 475, 417 N.E.2d 647 (1st Dist. 1981).
If the first degree murder verdict gives no indication whether it was predicated upon
felony-murder, the court might err if it sentenced for first degree murder rather than for
second degree murder when the jury had found the defendant guilty of both degrees of
murder. See People v. Washington, 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 468 N.E.2d 1285 (1st Dist.
1984).
125. See I.P.I. §§ 7.04A and 7.06A (Crim.) (2d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1987).
126. 106 Ill. 2d 186, 478 N.E.2d 335 (1985).
127. 108 Ill. 2d 54, 483 N.E.2d 203 (1985).
128. I believe that the return of multiple guilty verdicts of first degree murder and
second degree murder is more analogous to what occurred in Hoffer than to what oc-
curred in AImo. As the Hoffer courts explained, the multiple verdicts there were inconsis-
tent -with the Hoffer jury instructions. The Almo multiple verdicts were perfectly
consistent with the Almo jury instructions. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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stances nothing in the new scheme would justify a result different
than those reached under former law.
A. Attempted Second Degree Murder
Before the statutory change, some argued that Illinois should
recognize an offense called attempted voluntary manslaughter. 129
Ultimately, the issue is one of policy. When someone committed
what otherwise would have been murder while acting under in-
tense passion after serious provocation, the law reduced the grade
of the offense to voluntary manslaughter. When someone commit-
ted aggravated battery under intense passion after serious provoca-
tion, the law did not reduce the grade of the offense but instead
allowed mitigating circumstances to affect sentencing on the aggra-
vated battery conviction. The question was whether when some-
one committed what otherwise would have been attempted murder
while acting under intense passion after serious provocation, he
should have been deemed guilty of a lesser offense called attempted
voluntary manslaughter or instead should have been deemed guilty
of attempted murder with the mitigating circumstances allowed to
affect sentencing.
Professor O'Neill, proponent of the concepts underlying the new
first degree murder/second degree murder bill, has condemned the
Illinois Supreme Court for not interpreting Illinois law in People v.
Reagan 13 0 to conform to his own notions of wise policy. He fa-
vored recognition of a crime called attempted voluntary man-
slaughter. Both O'Neill and Steigmann argue that, because of the
change from voluntary manslaughter to second degree murder, Il-
linois courts should recognize a crime called attempted second de-
gree murder.' 3' Their position is inconsistent with Steigmann's
statement to the legislature that he intended, in writing the new
law, to retain in interpreting second degree murder "all of the...
case law . . . previously applicable to the offense of voluntary
manslaughter."'132
Although I would have joined O'Neill and Steigmann in arguing
for an offense called attempted voluntary manslaughter, I cannot
see how the change in name in any way affects the underlying ques-
129. Sachs, Is Attempt to Commit Voluntary Manslaughter a Possible Crime?, 71 ILL.
B.J. 166 (1982).
130. 99 Ill. 2d 238, 457 N.E.2d 1260 (1983). See O'Neill, supra note 2, at 223, in
which O'Neill wrote, "The Illinois Supreme Court, however, obstinately refused to recog-
nize the crime of attempt voluntary manslaughter."
131. See O'Neill, supra note 2, at 223-24; Steigmann, supra note 2, at 498-99.
132. Steigmann, supra note 2, at 498.
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tion previously resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court. Whatever
reasons supported a refusal to recognize attempted voluntary man-
slaughter, the same reasons apply to deny recognition of a crime
called attempted second degree murder. If a change is to be made,
it should not be made because of a variance in the nomenclature of
Illinois offenses that bears no analytical relationship to the ques-
tions discussed in Reagan. Rather it should be because of a reex-
amination of the underlying disputes discussed in that case.
B. Armed Violence Predicated Upon Second Degree Murder
The Illinois legislature provided that a person commits armed
violence when he, while armed with a dangerous weapon, commits
any felony defined by Illinois law. Nevertheless, the Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. Alejos 3 3 concluded that armed vio-
lence cannot be predicated upon voluntary manslaughter. The
court reasoned that because an offender is armed in most instances
in which he commits the Class One felony of voluntary manslaugh-
ter, the legislature could not have intended to allow prosecutors to
obtain the harsher Class X penalties for such conduct by utilizing
an armed violence charge predicated upon voluntary
manslaughter. 134
Those who argue that the court should not have departed from
the plain language of the armed violence statute might urge the
court to allow armed violence to be predicated upon second degree
murder. Whether or not Alejos was a sound decision, there is noth-
ing in the new statutory scheme that affects the analysis adopted in
Alejos. The new statute changed the name of the offenses, but it
did not alter the relationship between the lesser degree of homi-
cide, now renamed second degree murder, and armed violence. If
the Illinois Supreme Court chooses to depart from Alejos, it should
do so because of the reasons urged by the prosecution in Alejos and
not because the legislature has provided a new name for conduct
previously denominated voluntary manslaughter.
C. Instructing on Second Degree Murder Whenever Self Defense
Is in Issue
The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Lockett33 held that
133. 97 11. 2d 502, 455 N.E.2d 48 (1983).
134. The ordinary range for a Class One felony is between four and fifteen years. For
a Class X felony, the ordinary range is between six and thirty years. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1987).
135. 82 Ill. 2d 546, 413 N.E.2d 378 (1980).
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when the court is instructing the jury on self-defense, it must honor
a defense request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
The court reasoned rather abstractly that whenever there is enough
evidence to require jury consideration of whether the defendant
had a reasonable belief in the existence of justifying facts, there
necessarily is enough evidence to require jury consideration of
whether the defendant had an unreasonable belief of the existence
of justifying facts. Many experienced trial judges argue that this is
not so.' 36 When the prosecution's evidence, if believed, shows a
clear case of an unjustified killing, and the defense case, if believed,
shows a clear case of self-defense, there may be no room for the
intermediate finding that the defendant killed in an unreasonable
belief of justification.
Although I side with critics of Lockett, even as I side with critics
of Reagan and of Alejos, nothing in the new statutory scheme has
any analytical relationship to the Lockett issue that would alter the
result. If the premise of Lockett is correct, that evidence of a rea-
sonable belief of justification necessarily includes evidence of an
unreasonable belief, the change of the name of the lesser degree of
homicide from voluntary manslaughter to second degree murder
does not justify the overruling of Lockett.
D. Pleas of Guilty to Second Degree Murder
Under former law, if a defendant was charged with murder, a
trial judge could accept a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of vol-
untary manslaughter when the prosecutor agreed to the reduced
charge, when the plea was voluntary, and when there was a basis in
fact for the reduced charge. 137 It was a good idea, if not a constitu-
tional necessity, for the court to explain to the defendant the differ-
ence between the offense charged and the offense to which the
defendant was pleading guilty.' 38
Some judges at the recent Judicial Conference were concerned
that pleas of guilty will not be possible to second degree murder.
136. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 28 n.17. The Hon. Thomas Fitzgerald, who
chaired the 1987 Judicial Conference program on the new homicide law, first pointed this
out to me many years ago. He illustrated the point by using a hypothetical where the
defense version of what happened was so diametrically opposed to the prosecution ver-
sion that there was no possible basis for the trier of fact to adopt an intermediate version.
137. Compare People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 114 Ill. 2d 305, 500 N.E.2d 22 (1986),
requiring prosecutorial consent before a judge can dismiss a greater charge and accept a
plea to a lesser charge.
138. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), and Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
U.S. 422 (1983), concerning circumstances under which the court must explain to the
defendant the nature of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.
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Some reasoned that if a prosecutor cannot charge second degree
murder as a separate crime, the court cannot accept a plea to sec-
ond degree murder. They suggested that if second degree murder
really is not an offense, if it cannot be charged separately.
Even if prosecutors cannot charge second degree murder, the
legislature provided a penalty for second degree murder, and the
statutory scheme clearly contemplates judgments of convictions for
such an offense. Perhaps the legislature would have been wiser to
expressly state, as I once suggested, that pleas of guilty to the lesser
form of homicide would be permissible under the new scheme and
that the lesser offense of second degree murder is the result of
either a plea of guilty or a successful interposition of a partial af-
firmative defense to the offense of first degree murder. 139 Neverthe-
less, reviewing courts surely will reach this result without great
difficulty.
XVII. CONCLUSION
Amendments to frequently used penal statutes always bring liti-
gation. The new Illinois homicide law engendered more issues
than would have been necessary under a simpler proposal that
would have adequately addressed the problems that mandated a
legislative solution. Nevertheless, trial judges, though required to
give complex instructions to juries, will be able to resolve the issues
that arise. In many instances, where the parties call for a revisiting
of questions resolved under former law, nothing in the new statute
will dictate a departure from the analysis used to resolve those
questions under former law.
ADDENDUM-A JUDICIAL SOLUTION Too LATE
On June 20, 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Red-
139. After I abandoned efforts to create a scheme that permitted prosecutors to
charge voluntary manslaughter while still using the affirmative defense approach, see
supra, note 80, 1 proposed instead the following language:
The charging authority shall not bring a charge of voluntary manslaughter
whether by way of indictment, information, or complaint. A judgment of vol-
untary manslaughter may be entered only where (i) The defendant has success-
fully interposed the partial affirmative defense of voluntary manslaughter in
accordance with this section and sections 3-2(a) and (b) of the 1961 Code of
Criminal Law, as amended; or (2) A defendant charged with murder has en-
tered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, with the
consent of the court and of the prosecutors.
Memorandum dated February 4, 1985, from James Haddad to House Judiciary Counsel
Slingerland and attached to letter from James Haddad to Hon. John Cullerton, dated
June 7, 1985. Copy on file with author.
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dick "1 revolutionized the "old law" as to murder and voluntary
manslaughter. It held that where the prosecution has charged
murder, and where enough evidence also has been presented to en-
title the defendant to a voluntary manslaughter instruction, courts
must view voluntary manslaughter as an affirmative defense to
murder. Under these circumstances, to obtain a voluntary man-
slaughter conviction, the prosecution need not prove the presence
of mitigating circumstances. It need merely prove a knowing or
intentional unjustified killing.141 However, to obtain a murder con-
viction where voluntary manslaughter also is in issue, the prosecu-
tion must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of
mitigating circumstances. 142
Against this background, the court held that, where both mur-
der and voluntary manslaughter are in issue, it is "grave" error for
the court to use the approved I.P.I. 7.02 and I.P.I. 7.04 or 7.06.143
Instead, the court must modify the 7.02 murder instruction so that,
in order to find a defendant guilty or murder, the jury must find
beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of mitigating circum-
stances. Apparently, the court should also modify 7.04 and 7.06
voluntary manslaughter instructions, so as to delete all reference to
mitigating circumstances where murder is also in issue. On the
other hand, where the prosecution charges voluntary manslaughter
instead of murder, it must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the presence of the mitigating circumstances in order to obtain a
voluntary manslaughter conviction.
Reddick's restructuring of Illinois law to make voluntary man-
slaughter a partial affirmative defense parallels my 1982 sugges-
tions.144 The jury instructions required by Reddick appear to be
the ones I proposed to implement an affirmative defense ap-
proach. 14 If the Illinois Supreme Court had adopted this ap-
proach several years ago, I believe, for the reasons I stated in
arguing for the superiority of this approach, that there would have
been no need for Public Law 84-1450. Unfortunately, Reddick is a
140. No. 65005 (I11. S. Ct. June 20, 1988) (consolidated with People v. Lowe (No.
65022)). The decision does not apply to cases tried under the new second degree murder
statute. The court referred to, but did not resolve, the problem of the effective date of
Pub. Law 84-1450, discussed in text accompanying notes 86-93 supra. Slip op. at 8.
141. Id. at 6.
142. Id. at 8.
143. The court reversed the murder convictions even though counsel in the two mat-
ters under review had not objected to the instructions at trial, and even though counsel in
one of the cases had not raised the issue on appeal. Id. at 9.
144. See Haddad, supra note 4. See also supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
145. See Haddad, supra note 4, at 64-66.
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judicial solution too late. We now have second degree murder, and
we must struggle with the problems engendered by that new
legislation.
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APPENDIX
This instruction is for a case in which the judge instructs on first
degree murder, both forms of second degree murder, involuntary
manslaughter, insanity, and guilty but mentally ill. This is not an
approved I.P.I. instruction, but rather, is the author's extrapola-
tion from approved instructions. The manner in which the instruc-
tion integrated considerations of involuntary manslaughter is
strictly the author's. The Committee has not yet adopted a posi-
tion on that question.
I understand from conversations with the trial judge that the
factual situation in People v. Fierer, 151 Ill. App. 3d 649, 503
N.E.2d 594 (3d Dist. 1987), would require treatment of every issue
covered in this instruction if that case were to arise today.
To sustain the charge of first degree murder, the State must
prove each of the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the
death of _; and,
Second: That when the defendant did so,
(1) he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to
; or,
(2) he knew that his acts would cause death or
great bodily harm to _; and,
Third: That the defendant was not justified in using the force
which he used.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any
one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty [of first degree
murder]. You should then consider the lesser offense of involun-
tary manslaughter in accordance with the directions that I provide
later in these instructions.
If you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that
each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, then you should go on with your deliberations [on this
charge] to decide whether a mitigating factor has been proved so
that the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of second degree
murder instead of first degree murder.
You may not consider whether the defendant is guilty of the
lesser offense of second degree murder until and unless you have
first determined that the State has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the propositions of first degree murder.
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The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that a mitigating factor is present so that he is guilty
of the lesser offense of second degree murder instead of first degree
murder. By this I mean that you must be persuaded, considering
all the evidence in this case, that it is more probably true than not
true that at least one of the following mitigating factors is present:
(1) that the defendant, at the time he performed the acts which
caused the death of , acted under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation by [(the deceased)].
(2) that the defendant, at the time he performed the acts which
caused the death of , believed the circumstances to be
such that they justified the deadly force he used, but his belief that
such circumstances existed was unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that at
least one of these mitigating factors is present, then you should go
on with your deliberations to decide whether the defendant has
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty by
reason of insanity on the charge of second degree murder.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
defendant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
this mitigating factor is present, then you should go on with your
deliberations to decide whether the defendant has proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty by reason of in-
sanity on the charge of first degree murder.
You may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden
of proving that he is not guilty by reason of insanity on the charge
or either first or second degree murder until and unless you have
first determined that the State has proved the defendant guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt of the charge of first degree murder.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is
not guilty by reason of insanity, then you should find the defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity of whichever murder charge, either
first degree murder or second degree murder, that you found ear-
lier to be applicable, your deliberations on that charge should end,
and you should return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
on that murder charge.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
defendant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is not guilty by reason of insanity of first degree or second de-
gree murder, then you should continue your deliberations to deter-
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mine whether the defendant is guilty but mentally ill on that
murder charge.
A special verdict of guilty but mentally ill shall be returned by
you instead of a general verdict of guilty if you find each of the
following propositions to be present in this case:
First: That the defendant is guilty of whichever murder charge
you found earlier to be applicable; and,
Second: That the defendant was not legally insane at the time
he committed the murder; and,
Third: That the defendant was mentally ill at the time he com-
mitted that murder.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions concerning the guilty but mentally ill ver-
dict has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should return
the special verdict finding the defendant guilty but mentally ill of
the murder charge that you earlier found to be applicable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
either the second or third proposition concerning the guilty but
mentally ill verdict has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should return the general verdict finding the defendant
guilty of the murder charge that you earlier found to be applicable.
If in accordance with my earlier instructions you have found the
defendant not guilty of first degree murder and have ended your
deliberations on that charge as I instructed, you should then go on
to consider the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. You
may not consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser of-
fense of involuntary manslaughter until and unless you have first
determined that the State has not proved the defendant guilty of
first degree murder.
[At this point, the court would define the offense of involuntary
manslaughter under I.P.I. § 7.07. It would then provide an issues
instruction that combines I.P.I. § 7.08 with § 24-25.01-D. The ad-
ditional issues instruction alone would require another approxi-
mately four hundred and fifty words].
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